- China’s sluggish economy has led its leaders to make sweeping moves, but what is less clear is how the slowdown will affect ordinary Chinese, whose expectations and dissatisfaction are often heavily censored.
- A recent study found that Chinese people today are more likely to feel negatively about the economic situation than they did a few years ago, with the proportion of people feeling pessimistic about the future rising from just 2.3% in 2004 to 16% in 2023.
- Experts say the COVID-19 pandemic continues to haunt many Chinese, as the government’s tough but uncertain response during the pandemic has made people feel increasingly uncertain about their futures, especially for marginalized groups such as women trapped in a highly discriminatory labor market and rural residents long underserved by state welfare.
China’s sluggish economy has led its leaders to make every effort
China has unveiled stimulus measures, sometimes in the form of cash handouts, held unannounced talks to boost growth and tried to revive its struggling property market with a slew of policies, all in the past week.
On Monday, Xi spoke of “potential dangers” and “being well prepared” to overcome challenges, a move many believe was a reference to the economy. But what remains unclear is how the slowdown will affect ordinary Chinese, whose expectations and dissatisfaction are often heavily censored.
But two new studies offer some insights. The first, a survey of Chinese people’s attitudes toward the economy, found that people were becoming pessimistic and disappointed about their future. The second, a record of protests both in person and online, noted an increase in events fueled by economic discontent. While not complete, it paints a small picture of the current state of the economy and how Chinese people feel about their future.
In addition to the property crisis, soaring public debt and rising unemployment are weighing on savings and spending by the world’s second-largest economy, which could miss its 5% growth target this year, a move that could make the Chinese Communist Party uneasy as its rapid growth has made China a global power.
From positive to negative
The slowdown came as the COVID-19 pandemic ended, partly due to three years of sudden and strict lockdowns that ground economic activity to a halt. The differences between before and after the pandemic are clear, according to research by American professors Martin White of Harvard University and Scott Rozelle of the Center for the China Economy at Stanford University.
They conducted the surveys in 2004 and 2009, before Xi Jinping became China’s leader, and during Xi’s tenure in 2014 and 2023. The sample sizes varied, ranging from 3,000 to 7,500 people.
In 2004, nearly 60% of respondents reported that their family’s economic situation had improved over the past five years, and many felt optimistic about the next five years as well. This number increased in 2009 and 2014, with 72.4% and 76.5% respectively reporting an improvement in the situation, while 68.8% and 73% were hopeful about the future.
However, by 2023, only 38.8% felt that life for their family had improved, and less than half, or 47%, believed that the situation would improve in the next five years. At the same time, the proportion of those who felt pessimistic about the future increased from just 2.3% in 2004 to 16% in 2023.
Although the survey was drawn from a nationally representative sample of people aged 20 to 60, reaching a wide range of opinions is a challenge in China.
Respondents came from 29 Chinese provinces and territories, but excluded Xinjiang and parts of Tibet. White said this was due to “additional costs due to remote locations and political sensitivity.” These tightly controlled areas in the northwest, home to ethnic minorities, have long been under Chinese rule.
Those who were unwilling to provide feedback did not participate in the survey, the researchers said, while those who did share their opinions were informed that they were for academic purposes and would remain confidential.
Their concerns are reflected in the choices many young Chinese are making. With unemployment soaring, millions of college graduates are forced into low-paying jobs, while some adopt a “lie-flat” or “tangping” attitude, a Chinese slang term for rejecting social pressures to work too hard and achieve too much. Others choose to be “full-time kids,” returning home to their parents because they can’t find work or are burned out.
Analysts believe China’s strict handling of Covid-19 played a major role in dwindling people’s hopes.
“It was a turning point for many,” said Alfred Wu, an associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore. “It was a reminder to everyone of how authoritarian the state is. People feel more in control than ever before.” He added that many were feeling depressed and the subsequent pay cuts “made confidence even lower.”
Is Hard Work Worth It? Today’s Chinese Say “No”
However, surveys have found that work is no longer a sign of a bright future. In 2004, 2009 and 2014, more than 6 in 10 respondents agreed that “effort will always be rewarded,” while about 15% disagreed.
By 2023, that sentiment had changed. Only 28.3 percent believed their hard work would be rewarded, while a third of them disagreed. Disagreement was strongest among low-income families, those with an annual income of less than 50,000 yuan.
Chinese people are often told that years spent studying and pursuing degrees will pay off in financial success. Part of this expectation is shaped by a turbulent history in which people have endured the pain of war and famine and moved on.
Chinese leaders have also extolled the virtues of such hard work. For example, Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream echoes the American Dream, where hard work and talent are rewarded. He urges young people to “eat bitterness,” a Chinese phrase for enduring hardship.
But in 2023, a majority of respondents to a study by Martin White and Scott Rosell believed people were rich because of the privileges their families and relatives gave them. A decade earlier, respondents had attributed wealth to ability, talent, a good education and hard work.
While Xi Jinping’s signature “shared prosperity” policy aims to narrow the wealth gap, critics say it has only resulted in a crackdown on businesses.
Other indicators of dissatisfaction, such as an 18% increase in protests in the second quarter of 2024 compared to the same period last year, according to the China Dissent Monitor (CDM).
The study defines protest as any event in which people express their dissatisfaction or promote their interests in a way that conflicts with authority, which can occur virtually or online. Such events, however small, can still have an impact in China, where even lone protesters can be swiftly tracked down and detained.
Kevin Slaten, one of the CDM’s report authors, said at least three out of four were due to economic problems, with the group recording nearly 6,400 such incidents since June 2022.
They found that protests led by rural residents and ordinary workers were mostly about land grabs and low wages, and that middle-class protesters were also rallying against the housing crisis, with protests by landlords and construction workers accounting for 44% of all cases in more than 370 cities. But Mr. Slaten stressed that “this does not immediately mean that China’s economy is collapsing.”
How worried is the Communist Party?
Chinese leaders are certainly concerned.
Between August 2023 and January 2024, the Chinese government stopped releasing youth unemployment figures after the figures hit record highs. Officials at one time coined the term “slow employment” to describe people who took their time looking for work, which they said was a separate category from the unemployed.
Censors have cracked down on all sources of financial turmoil, with posts expressing opinions swiftly removed and influencers blocked on social media for flaunting their luxury tastes. State media said the bans were part of efforts to create a “civilized, healthy and harmonious” environment, while reports last week suggested leading economist Zhu Hengpeng had been detained for criticizing Xi Jinping’s economic management.
Mr Slaten said the Communist Party was trying to control the narrative by dictating what information people accessed or what they perceived to be negative.
CDM research shows that even with some state control, discontent continues to spark protests, and that should worry the government.
In November 2022, a devastating fire that killed at least 10 people who were not allowed to leave the building during the COVID-19 lockdown prompted thousands of people to take to the streets in parts of China to protest the crackdown on COVID-19.
Martin White and Scott Rozelle don’t think their findings suggest that “public anger about inequality is likely to erupt into a volcano of social protest.” They say the economic slowdown has begun to “undermine” the legitimacy the party has built through “decades of sustained economic growth and rising living standards.”
Yun Zhou, a sociology professor at the University of Michigan, said the COVID-19 pandemic continues to haunt many Chinese. The government’s “tough but uncertain response” during the pandemic has made people feel more uncertain about the future. This is particularly evident among marginalized groups, such as women trapped in a highly discriminatory labor market and rural residents whose welfare has been underserved for a long time.
Under the “hukou” system, which is similar to the civil registration system used to control population movement and has been in place since 1958, urban migrant workers are not allowed to use public services such as sending their children to government schools.
But young people from the city are flocking to remote towns that attract tourists because of their cheap rents, beautiful scenery and greater freedom to pursue their dreams.
About information
The research by Martin White and Scott Rosell is based on four academic surveys conducted between 2004 and 2023.
The face-to-face survey was conducted in collaboration with researchers from the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University in 2004, 2009, and 2014. Participants were aged 18–70 and came from 29 provinces, excluding Tibet and Xingjiang.
In 2023, the China Household Finance Survey and Research Center (CHFS) at Southwest University of Finance and Economics in Chengdu conducted three rounds of online surveys in late Q2, Q3 and Q4. Participants were aged between 20 and 60.
All surveys used the same questions. To ensure comparable responses across the four years, researchers separated participants between the ages of 18-19 and 61-70 and weighted all responses to make them nationally representative. All surveys have margin of error.
The study has been accepted for publication by The China Journal and is expected to be published in 2025.
Researchers at China Dissent Monitor (CDM) have been collecting data on “dissent incidents” across China since June 2022 from a variety of non-government sources, including news reports, domestically-run social media platforms, and civil society organizations.
Dissent incidents refer to public and informal expressions of dissatisfaction by individuals or groups. Each incident is highly visible and subject to, or at risk of, government response through physical repression or censorship, which may include widespread social media posts, protests, banner distribution, and demonstrations. Many of these incidents are difficult to independently verify.
Source: BBC
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